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I. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS AND
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the key-
stone document of international refugee protection. While the
Convention has remained the same since its drafting, the type of situa-
tions to which it has been applied has changed significantly. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initiated the Global
Consultations on International Protection in 2001 to affirm the continued
keystone value of the 1951 Convention in international refugee protec-
tion in the wake of changes since its drafting.
* L.L.M (expected 2004), London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D.
(2003), University of Michigan; B.A. (2000), Southwestern University. If such an effort merits
a dedication, one should be to the author's sister and grandmother, for they were never far
from his mind during the writing of this paper.
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UNHCR divided the Global Consultations process into three
"tracks." The first track consisted of meetings of all states parties to the
1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol. This meeting produced a
declaration by which states parties formally affirmed their political
commitment to the continued and expanded use of the 1951 Convention
as the basis for refugee protection.' The second track, a series of round-
table discussions eliciting expert opinions on the 1951 Convention,
derived its stamp of approval from the states parties who agreed to the
first track and the Declaration. The third track of discussions has taken
place within the Executive Committee of UNHCR and is "structured
around a number of protection policy matters, including issues not ade-
quately covered by the 1951 Convention."2
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consul-
tations on International Protection is a compilation of the "second
track" legal opinions and the Summary Conclusions of the expert work-
ing groups. These opinions and Conclusions address nine specific areas
of international refugee law within the framework of the 1951 Conven-
tion. Some of the refugee, legal community's most gifted minds
contributed to the opinions and the Conclusions are the result of round-
table discussions of a broad international group of experts in the field of
refugee protection.
Any critical analysis and review of this book must acknowledge the
human hours invested into the process and the extensive experience
brought together under one cover as well as the political will of many
countries necessary to push forward such a process. Moreover, this com-
pilation goes beyond contributing to academic discourse; the authors
seek to persuade an audience of policy-makers, politicians, practitioners
and jurists.
As a result, Refugee Protection in International Law is both an
analysis of the development of the law of international refugee status and
a significant development in and of itself. The breadth, depth and focus
of the book demands less narrow legal criticism and call for a different
mode of analysis.
Such an analysis of Refugee Protection in International Law, in its
parts and as a whole, is possible by situating the chapters of the text in
relation to the goals of the Global Consultations process. Moreover, such
1. REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS
ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 81 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
2. UNHCR, Protecting Refugees: Global Consultations on International Protection, at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+ywwFqzvxsqnwWx6xFqzvxsqnwWx6mFqA
72ZROgRfZNhFqhTONuItFqrpGdBnqBzFqr72ZROgRAFqwDzmwwwwwwww I Fqr72ZROgR
(last visited June 21, 2004).
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analysis is useful to determine how Refugee Protection in International
Law fits into the evolving framework of refugee protection. In her pref-
ace to the book, Erika Feller, Director of International Protection for
UNHCR, explains the goals of the Global Consultations process. These
interrelated goals flow throughout the entire book:
" To reach a clearer understanding and a more consistent im-
plementation of international refugee law;
* To realize durable protection solutions for refugees;
* To maintain respect for the world's most vulnerable people,
those most likely displaced in any refugee situation;
" To strengthen the asylum system and make protection more
effective;
" To rise to the challenges facing modern international refugee
law;
" To shore up the framework of international protection prin-
ciples;
" To explore the scope of enhancing protection through new
approaches;
" To share best practices between states;
* To work toward sharing burdens more equitably;
" To work toward the implementation of framework principles
clarified to a modem meaning;
* To achieve all of this within the same original document: the
1951 Convention.'
3. Erika Feller, Preface to REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at xvii; see also UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion on International Protection,
No. 90 (2001), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=
EXCOM&id=3bd3e3024&page=EXEC (last visited June 21, 2004); UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee Conclusion on International Protection, No. 89 (2000), available at http://
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=EXCOM&id=3ae68c7eO&page=EXEC
(last visited June 21, 2004); Erika Feller, Statement at the 24th Meeting of the Standing
Committee on International Protection (June 25, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/ texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3e379ee3a (last
visited June 21, 2004). See generally Erika Feller, The 1951 Convention in its 50th
Anniversary Year, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=
PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3e379f354 (last visited June 21, 2004) (statement to
the 52nd Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme); Erika
Feller, Department of International Protection, Revitalizing the Refugee Protection Regime:
The Road Ahead as the 1951 Convention turns 50, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bintexis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3b938be74 (last
visited June 21, 2004) (statement to the 5 1st Session of the Executive Committee at Geneva).
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The importance of Refugee Protection in International Law becomes
clear in situating and analyzing the book as an instrument of these goals
and of the Global Consultations on Refugee Protection, as opposed to a
report or commentary of the "second track" of the Global Consultations.
This review traces the threads of the goals through each of the legal
opinions in the book and then summarizes the impact of the collection of
legal opinions on international refugee law. The work as a whole and its
individual parts is not merely a significant analysis and commentary on
the 1951 Convention fifty years after its drafting. Refugee Protection in
International Law is a significant development in the international pro-
tection of refugees.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL LEGAL OPINIONS
A. Non-refoulement
The rights of the individual as against the interests of the state flow
through the goals of the Global Consultations and must play a critical
role in the future of refugee protection. By placing the interests of the
individual above those of the state in all but the most specific circum-
stances, refugees realize enduring and safe solutions and the world's
most vulnerable people realize full respect. Such a prioritization funda-
mentally strengthens the granting of asylum and makes protection more
effective. Non-refoulement is at the heart of this prioritization.
Refugee Protection in International Law begins with an analysis of
non-refoulement in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. Article 33 is the
cornerstone of the Convention and critical to refugee protection. Sir
Elihu Lauterpacht QC and Daniel Bethlehem set out a comprehensive
analysis of the scope and content of the principle. Non-refoulement is an
absolute norm of state conduct and Lauterpacht and Bethlehem argue for
a liberal construction of the language of the provision. Article 33(1) de-
scribes the rights of the individual against a state and Article 33(2)
describes the abilities of a state against the individual. By arguing for a
maximized, liberal reading of Article 33(1) and of the customary interna-
tional law of non-refoulement, and for a minimized, narrow view of
Article 33(2) and the exceptions to the customary international law of
4. "Non-refoulement is a concept which prohibits States from returning a refugee or
asylum seeker to territories where there is a risk [on life or freedom due to] race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." Sir Elihu Lauter-
pacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement:
Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 89.
[Vol. 25:751
Refugee Protection in International Law
non-refoulement, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem affirm the priority of the
individual over the interests of the state in refugee protection
The primacy of the individual anchors certain goals of the Global
Consultations process: attempts to rise to modem challenges, such as the
changing conflict between the state interest in migration control and the
right to seek asylum on the part of individuals;6 efforts to shore up the
existing framework of protection, notably with regard to gender;7 and
exploration of new approaches to enhance protection. In addition, the
sharing of best practices with a view to a uniform approach and of the
burden of refugees between states, and clarification of framework prin-
ciples, depend on the priority of individual rights. State interests vary
and these interests cannot be uniform across borders. Common sense
dictates that if the individual is prioritized in protection some uniformity
across borders can be realized.
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem lay a legal foundation rooted in the 1951
Convention for the future of refugee protection by reminding of the pri-
ority of the individual over the state in the core principle of non-
refoulement.
B. Penalties and Detention of Asylum Seekers or Refugees
Guy Goodwin-Gill's argument for interpretation of Article 31 of the
1951 Convention maximizes the rights of the individual as against the
interests of the state, like the work of Lauterpacht and Bethlehem on
non-refoulement. Goodwin-Gill argues that states can impose penalties
on or detain asylum seekers or refugees only after meeting particular
5. Id.
6. See Nina Bernstein, Children Alone and Scared, Fighting Deportation, NY TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/28/nyregion/
28CHIL.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) ("[These children] have stumbled into a complex
intersection of government interests after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, as a crackdown to
protect national security collides with a long tradition of protecting juveniles."); Partial Deal
over EU Asylum Rules, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 31, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/europe/3585911 .stm (last visited June 21, 2004) ("[Ruud Lubbers, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees] said the EU proposals flew in the face of commitments made by
member states to protect the right to seek asylum while they harmonised national policies.");
Phil Mercer, Australia's Unease with Outsiders, BBC ONLINE, Apr. 2, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilworld/asia-pacific/3550241 .stm (last visited June 21, 2004); James
Helm, Ireland Struggles with Immigration Issue, BBC ONLINE, Apr. 4, 2004, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3595547.stm (last visited June 21, 2004).
7. The "public/private" distinction and its problematic effect on women in international
law is well-noted. The evolving legal framework to recognize persecution of women within
the "private" sphere and not only within the "public" sphere requires a firm recognition of the
rights of the individual over interests of the state. Such a recognition of "private" persecution
potentially increases the number of individuals seeking asylum, contrary with a state interest
in regulating borders and controlling migration. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE
CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS, (2000).
Spring 2004]
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conditions. Unlike the principle of non-refoulement, however, the law of
penalties and detention is not particularly clear nor have states parties
implemented it consistently.8 Goodwin-Gill therefore explains clearly the
law of penalties and detention within the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention with a view towards more consistent implementation. Dura-
ble solutions-any protection solutions-are not possible if states parties
penalize and detain refugees and asylum seekers on grounds of conven-
ience instead of necessity. States parties cannot maintain respect for
vulnerable persons who seek protection abroad if penalties or detention
are imposed unnecessarily.
To so explain, Goodwin-Gill uses interpretive principles of treaty
law and developments subsequent to the 1951 Convention to show the
continued relevance of the 1951 Convention to the areas of penalties9 and
detention.' ° In so doing, his work strengthens the granting of asylum and
allows for more effective protection by showing the limited circum-
stances under which the process from entry to a grant of asylum may be
slowed by penalties or detention. Goodwin-Gill addresses one of the per-
tinent challenges facing refugee protection-growing national security
concerns that threaten to overshadow individual rights."
Goodwin-Gill shores up the current framework of protection relating
to penalties and detention and lays a foundation for new legal ap-
proaches, namely improved state practice. His detailed analysis both of
the law and the failure of states in practice to adhere clarifies this spe-
cific protection dilemma and shadows the problem of sharing best
8. Goodwin-Gill begins with a textual examination of Article 31(1) particularly probing
the problems posed by certain terms of the Article. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention, and Protec-
tion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 193-96.
9. Goodwin-Gill points out that mere formal compliance in terms of national legislation
or case law inadequately meets the obligations of a state party under Article 31. Instead, there
must be an inquiry as to whether the system of refugee protection in the State party concerned
has "attained the international standard of reasonable efficacy and efficient implementation of
the treaty provisions concerned." Id. at 216. Therefore, it is possible to frame Goodwin-Gill's
analysis of both the difficult terms of Article 31(1) and the national legal systems of states
parties charged with putting Article 31(1) into practice in a legal standard: has there been a
systemic failure on the part of a state party to put into practice policies consistent in result
with a purposeful reading of Article 31(1)? If so, state parties are in violation of their
obligations under the 1951 Convention.
10. Goodwin-Gill also discusses Article 31(2) relating to detention of refugees and asy-
lum seekers. Detention presents a significant problem for refugee protection. States have a
margin within which to detain in certain circumstances but these circumstances are not alto-
gether clear. Goodwin-Gill examines how international law has moved to address what is
permissible within this margin. Id. at 224-25. From Goodwin-Gill's analysis, a second legal
standard, relating to Article 31(2) can be posited: Is detention the only possible option, neces-
sary and proportional to a legitimate conditional justification, with appropriate safeguards for
the detained? If not, the detention in question is not permissible under the 1951 Convention.
11. Id. at 188.
[Vol. 25:751
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practices in this area.' 2 Increased penalties and detention, moreover, may
facilitate burden sharing of refugees, as deterrents to entry and channels
for refugee flows to other states.'3 Yet Goodwin-Gill's emphasis on the
rights of the individual over the interests of the state forces states to look
to less convenient methods to reallocate refugee burdens.
In clarifying and uniting the international law, national statutes and
case law and state practice, Goodwin-Gill addresses well an area of
refugee law with significant ramifications for those individuals seeking
and obtaining asylum.
C. Membership of a Particular Social Group
While the issue of detention and penalties raises questions of how
far the 1951 Convention can be used to regulate the entry and granting of
asylum, 'membership of a particular social group' takes the 1951 Con-
vention in an altogether different direction. How far will the 1951
Convention bend to grant protection to those individuals who do not
clearly fall within its grounds for relief before it breaks under the ambi-
guity of the term: 'membership of a particular social group?'
Alexander Aleinikoff acknowledges that a clearer understanding of
what was originally meant by 'membership of a particular social group'
may not be possible. 4 Thus, he proposes a correct interpretation modem
decisionmakers can apply that leads to consistent application of the 1951
Convention. Correct interpretation is crucial to maintain the 1951 Con-
vention's integrity and the system of refugee protection. Solutions and
respect for the plight of refugees would be difficult to realize, and the
granting of asylum and effectiveness of protection would be crippled, if
an overbroadening of the social group category threatened international
refugee protection. The 1951 Convention's ambiguity on this point is the
source of concern and Aleinikoff's implicit challenge in this chapter is to
resolve this ambiguity consistent with the object and purpose of the 1951
12. Id.
13. General Secretary Peer Baneke, Asylum in Europe: Developments in 2001, Speech at
the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) Biannual Meeting in Seville, Spain
(June 9, 2002), at http://www.ecre.org/speeches/bgmsev.shtml (last visited June 21, 2004).
14. On this question of great ambiguity in the Convention, ironically the travaux are
cryptic and sparse, and unhelpful. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and
Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of 'Membership of a Particular Social Group',
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, at 265. The UNHCR Hand-
book is some 26 years old, and as such its guidelines for 'membership of a particular social
group' reflect the lack of serious challenges at that time to the problematic ambiguity of the
category. Aleinikoff, supra, at 266.
Spring 2004]
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Convention. He succeeds by taking interpretations from primarily com-
mon law courts and crafting a synthesis of those ideas.'
5
Aleinikoff's synthesis clarifies the current framework by examining
current questions of interpretation 6 and setting out an interpretive
framework based on current best practices and approaches.1 This syn-
thesis provides a good understanding of the protection dilemma posed by
the social group category, to begin. Moreover, such a common interpre-
tation may lead to more proportionate refugee burden sharing between
states." This chapter clarifies protection based on membership of a par-
ticular social group within a modem meaning, although Aleinikoff's
approach may be criticized by those who note the increasing role that
non-state actors may play in private sphere persecution of women and
the emerging value of the 'membership of a particular social group'
category in addressing this persecution.'9
Through his clarification and analysis, Aleinikoff sorts through the
complex and challenging issue of 'membership of a particular social
group', towards clear understanding and uniform application of the 1951
Convention.
15. Aleinikoff examines jurisprudence from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and New Zealand. Id. at 270, 272, 274, 275, 280.
16. See Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability For Violence Against
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognising Claims Based on Gen-
der Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 281 (2002).
17. Aleinikoff puts forward two approaches that he argues govern the core inquiry in the
case of a claim brought on membership in a particular social group: the protected characteris-
tics approach of Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 and the social
perceptions approach of Applicant A & Another v. Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs &
Another (1997) 190 C.L.R. 225 (Austl.). For Aleinikoff, the social perception test of Applicant
A is closer to the meaning and purpose of the Convention than the approach in Ward and thus
doctrinally preferable as an approach for interpretation. Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 296.
18. For the idea that different standards lead to disproportionate burdens, see Walter Kdlin,
Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 632 ("Disregard for interna-
tional refugee law might create secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers who have
to look for a country where their rights are respected.").
19. See Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability For Violence Against
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognising Claims Based on Gen-
der Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 281 (2002). A chief concern of any liberal
interpretation of 'membership in a particular social group' is whether the refugee protection
system will be overwhelmed with applications. Aleinikoff notes that the linking of a protected
ground with a failure of state protection is an inherent and critical constraint that, if properly
applied, can reduce this concern in the context of persecution at the hands of non-state actors.
He argues that the system of protection will not be overwhelmed, for example by claims of
women who are abused in the 'private' sphere as opposed to the public, if decision makers
require a systemic or sustained failure of protection before granting refugee status. Aleinikoff,
supra note 14, 301-03. Concerns about the evidentiary burden of proving failure of state pro-
tection for women abused domestically aside, Aleinikoff applies his framework for analysis to
three other particularly pertinent current situations: claims based upon sexual orientation,
family-based claims and Chinese coercive family practices. Id. at 304-09.
[Vol. 25:751
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D. Gender-related Persecution
Gender-related persecution is closely related to 'membership of a
particular social group.' As gender is not a specified ground for relief
under the 1951 Convention, claims of gender-related persecution have
been brought under the heading of 'membership of a particular social
group' in the past. Gender-related persecution gives rise to tensions that,
on their face, are not resolved simply by categorizing gender as a 'social
group'. Roger Haines wrestles with several sets of these tensions in his
examination of gender-related persecution. °
Haines negotiates between the obvious reality that women and men
are inherently different and may thus suffer different persecution"2  and
the inclination to reduce the persecution experiences of women to simply
issues of gender (and to essentialize women within the refugee law
framework).22 Haines must also address the remarkable failure of states
parties to apply the 1951 Convention in a gender-sensitive manner and
the impulse to create a new framework--one that recognizes persecution
for reasons of gender as an independent ground for granting refugee
23status.
Haines analysis succeeds in reaching a clearer understanding of
refugee law by reminding the reader that gender sensitivity and non-
discrimination are integral concepts of the 1951 Convention. It is not the
Convention but its application that is problematic; Haines challenges the
patriarchal notions that have historically tainted the view of refugee de-
cisionmakers. 4 In so doing, Haines' argument strengthens the granting of
20. Rodger Haines QC, Gender-related Persecution, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 319.
21. Haines notes the emerging understandings of sex and gender in international refugee
law in jurisprudence, state practice, and scholarly works. Id. at 322.
22. Simply because a woman brings a claim for asylum rooted in her gender or her sex
does not mean that she should be "automatically" granted refugee status. Id. at 322. She must
still satisfy the criteria of the 1951 Convention for that status to be granted. See also Randall,
supra note 16, at 303.
23. Randall, supra note 16, at 301-03; see also Mattie Stevens, Recognizing Gender-
Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'v 179 (1993). But see Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of
Categories, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995)
24. To begin, women must have the same access as men to apply for refugee protection.
Haines, supra note 20, at 324. At the same time, the focus of any refugee inquiry must remain
on the specific characteristics of the claimant. Moreover, sex and gender must be integral
elements of that refugee inquiry. Id. at 325. Haines notes that the 1951 Convention must be
viewed, in light of the 1967 Protocol, as a dynamic human rights instrument and no longer a
static document fixed in time. Id. at 326. Finally, decision-makers must view sex and gender
as an integral, albeit implicit, part of the refugee definition. As a result of the prevalence of a
male perspective in the granting of asylum, however, decision-makers have not heeded these
areas of concern regarding the refugee claims of women. Thus, the interpretation of the
Spring 20041
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asylum and makes protection more effective under the existing frame-
work.2
A question arises: is the existing framework adequate? Or should a
different framework be explored? Haines answers, without much doubt,
that the 1951 Convention adequately addresses gender-related persecu-
tion in its current form.26 Does this adherence rise to the modem
challenge of violence against women as persecution2 7 and to the doubts
on the part of many that the 1951 Convention can provide protection
from such persecution?
These questions are part of the tensions that Haines must balance
and his chapter promotes a clearer understanding of the protection di-
lemma facing decision-makers regarding gender-related persecution. The
tensions in this area are balanced towards a clarification of framework
principles and their modem meanings. Haines infuses the meaning of
persecution under the refugee definition of Article 1(A)(2) with guide-
lines for a gender-sensitive interpretation that preserves the current
Convention. 2 Gender must inform the assessment of all five current con-
vention grounds. Once a gender-sensitive assessment is utilized, the
extent to which gender colours and strengthens these grounds is evident,
to the benefit of women seeking ref 29to he eneit se ingrefugee protection .
Haines succeeds in resolving perhaps the most critical tension: be-
tween the face of the framework principles and the modem meaning
grounds already enumerated in the Convention suffers from the lack of a gender-sensitive
interpretation. Id. at 327.
25. The granting of asylum and protection are strengthened in the state of asylum's ac-
knowledgement of the validity of the persecution faced by a woman due, in many ways, to the
mere fact that she is a woman. Through a nuanced understanding of the different types of
persecution, there is a richer and stronger awareness and mainstreaming of gender. This un-
derstanding allows a fuller definition of "protection" from persecution, both for men and
women.
26. Haines, supra note 20, at 326.
27. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 59th
Sess. 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1 (2003); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, On
Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 21 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
MacKinnon states:
A simple double standard is at work here. What fundamentally distinguishes tor-
ture, understood in human rights terms, from the events that [women who submitted
stories of abuse to the author] have described is that torture is done to men as well
as to women. Torture is regarded as politically motivated not personal; the state is
involved in it. I want to ask why the torture of women by men is not seen as torture,
why it is not seen as politically motivated, and what is the involvement of the state
in it?
MacKinnon, supra, at 25.
28. Haines, supra note 20, at 329-31.
29. Id. at 342.
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demanded of them. Decision-makers should consider properly the ques-
tion of gender-related persecution within the current framework.0
E. The Internal Protection Alternative
The principle of state protection is another example of a fundamental
framework principle that must be clarified in light of recent develop-
ments. The internal alternative to external asylum must now be taken
into account as a possible basis for denial of surrogate state protection.
Although this basis is not directly contemplated by the language of the
1951 Convention," the internal alternative is strongly rooted in the prin-
ciple of state protection of Article 13 Simply put, where country of
origin protection exists, surrogate state protection by cannot exist.
The conceptual basis for the internal alternative contains common
elements but otherwise is in disarray, as James C. Hathaway and Mi-
chelle Foster note.33 Hathaway and Foster identify the commonalities in
approaches; 34 the proper procedural place of the inquiry into existence of
an internal alternative;3 5 and rhetorical and substantive baselines that
should be established.36 They clarify the internal alternative with a view
towards needed consistent implementation.
30. Of critical importance is Haines' analysis of "political opinion" as a ground for pro-
tection, for it is here that he situates the public/private divide and how it can be addressed, via
a gender sensitive interpretation, in the 1951 Convention. Id. at 346.
31. That an internal alternative to external asylum could be a plausible basis for denial of
protection comes from the 1979 edition of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Deter-
mining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 91 (1992), available
at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+BwwBm-el4VpwwwwnwwwwwwwhFqhT
yfEtFqnplxcAFqhT0yfEcFq4lwDmxddAadDa7Gdqnml Gn5awDmagGoBnGowDzmxwwwww
wwlFqmRbZopendoc.pdf (last visited June 22, 2004) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]. James
C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Internal Protection/RelocationlFlight Alternative as an Aspect
of Refugee Status Determination, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 361.
32. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 31, at 358.
33. See id. at 365-81.
34. There are three commonalities to most approaches, rooted in the original formulation
of the UNHCR Handbook, supra note 31: the inquiry into internal protection may be retro-
spective or prospective; may use a 'reasonable person' standard or an analysis of the
individual circumstances of each applicant; and may focus on the mindset of the individual in
seeking out an internal alternative or the willingness of the country of origin to provide protec-
tion. The differences in approaches revolve around these three poles.
35. Only if a clear division between an analysis of well-founded fear and an analysis of a
failure of state protection is made can the possibility of an internal alternative be assessed
properly within the assessment of a failure of state protection: without confusion, without
undue influence given to factors which have no real bearing upon the parts of this framework
and without short-changing the required well-founded fear inquiry, once such a framework is
put in place. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 31, at 366.
36. Hathaway and Foster submit that the correct term is not 'internal flight alternative'
nor 'internal relocation alternative' but rather should reflect the inquiry into state protection:
Spring 20041
Michigan Journal of International Law
The internal alternative becomes a durable solution only if coherent,
stringent principles guide the determination of the viability of that inter-
nal alternative. These principles must allow the "adequacy of accessible
protection" to emerge in status determination.37 As Hathaway and Foster
point out, in the hands of an experienced decision-maker there is no need
for such principles-it is in other situations in which such guidelines are
necessary to protect individuals from refoulementf8 While Hathaway and
Foster may take some discretion away from decision-makers, they do so
to strengthen the granting of asylum. Their proposal makes protection
more effective, preserves the integrity of surrogate protection and re-
spects the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers in the process.3
Hathaway and Foster seek out the best approach to a practice rooted
in "state protection" of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. They address
and synthesize the responses of states of asylum to failures of states of
origin to protect all internal areas of their territories. States of asylum
should deny refugee protection where surrogate protection is not neces-
sary. The lines in procedure, substance and rhetoric must be clear to
avoid refoulement.
F. Exclusion
States may also deny refugee protection where it is deemed unde-
served. The exclusion clauses of Article IF and Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention deny refugee protection without any consideration of cir-
cumstances beyond the acts that bring an individual under the purview of
the clauses. Geoff Gilbert analyzes these potentially dangerous provi-
sions.4° A clear understanding of how these clauses operate is elusive and
at times the exclusion clauses suffer from the age of their terms.4' This
'internal protection alternative.' In addition, they submit that the reasonability of an appli-
cant's actions should no longer be a consideration within a properly situated analysis of an
internal alternative, nor should questions of 'safety' be asked either. Rather, there must be an
assessment of the adequacy of accessible protection, a clear term defined by the 1951 Conven-
tion, in the specific circumstances of the individual applicant. Id. at 381-89.
37. Hathaway and Foster reference the unique Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Pro-
tection Alternative. Id. at 361, 389-411 (citing James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines
on the Internal Protection Alternative, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 131 (1999)).
38. The experienced decision maker will often reach the same conclusion under these
principles, the authors point out, as in a reasonable exercise of their discretion. Id. at 409.
39. Specifically, the system of burden allocation at the status determination level in the
authors' proposal critically relieves the applicant of a possibly insurmountable burden of proof
in proving that in all areas of the country of origin there is a lack of state protection. Hathaway
& Foster, supra note 31, at 409.
40. Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in REFU-
GEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 425.
41. For example, Article 1F(a) revolves around three definitions, none of which are par-
ticularly clear. Id. at 433. Furthermore, analysis of Article 1F(b) snags on the meaning of a
serious non-political crime. Id. at 439. Article 1F(c) runs the risk of being so vague as to lead
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reflects a historical reality. The current climate of terrorism, ethnic con-
flict and general international instability have turned a focus to the
41exclusion clauses as at no point in the history of the 1951 Convention.
Gilbert's argument for how states should apply the exclusion clauses
strengthens asylum law in two ways. First, their judicious application
strengthens the institution of asylum by ensuring that protection is
granted to those who deserve it. Second, avoiding capricious application
or lack of application of the exclusion clauses preserves the integrity and
legitimacy of the asylum process.43 This is to be lauded if we in the law
value a logical, process-based result, if not as much as the result alone
but preservative of individual dignity and thus the propriety of systems
and their eventual result. Most decision-makers do not want to send an-
other person home to a country where that person faces harm but
sometimes that happens. The legitimacy of the asylum process and its
results depends upon ensuring that the exclusion clauses operate using
proper procedures and standards.
Specifically, Gilbert argues that additional steps to the current
framework should be taken to avoid reliance on other human rights con-
ventions. His approach is to make a second inquiry after an individual is
found excludable into the harm of the exclusion to the individual. This is
in order to protect those individuals whom the 1951 Convention is on its
face unable to protect yet whom should receive protection under interna-
tional law."
Through his analysis, Geoff Gilbert describes the dilemma presented
by the lack of historical and definitional clarity that results in uncertain
application of the exclusion clauses. His chapter goes beyond this
to abusive and unwarranted exclusion of claimants from protection. Id. at 455. Aside from
terrorism, it is unclear what other acts constitute those contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations, or who, in terms of seniority in an entity, can commit such acts. Finally,
Gilbert notes the confused relationship in State practice between Article IF and Article 33(2).
The two articles are used interchangeably and at misplaced points in the status determination
inquiry by many states parties. Id. at 458.
42. Id. at 429.
43. See, e.g., United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, Rights Groups
Decry French Asylum Given to Genocide Suspect, Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=32078&SelectRegion=GreatLakes&SelectCountry=
RWANDA (last visited June 21, 2004).
44. Gilbert argues that a purposive approach to the 1951 Convention should develop
Article 1F(b) particularly to include a double balancing test, and reduce usage of external
treaties as safety nets: one, the decision-maker should consider whether a non-political crime
is significant enough to merit exclusion, and if so, decision-makers should then balance the
result of exclusion against the fear of persecution. Id. at 453. Gilbert argues that a second
double balancing test should be employed in the operation of Article 33(2), as in Article 1F(b).
Once an individual is found to be returnable under Article 33(2), a decision-maker should then
balance the individual's fear of persecution upon return with the harm to the host country if
the individual remains. Id. at 462.
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dilemma, moreover, and moves toward a clarification of the modem
meaning of two fundamental framework principles-non-refoulment and
exclusion.
G. Cessation of Refugee Status
Cessation of refugee status is another potentially dangerous area of
refugee law. Whereas exclusion from refugee status denies state protec-
tion alone, cessation of refugee status denies state protection and
removes a legal status as well. Joan Fitzpatrick and Rafael Bonoan as-
sess the cessation clauses without arguing for their increased use-yet
presenting procedures that could facilitate the increased use of the cessa-
tion clauses. 5
The approaches of UNHCR and states parties to the operation of Ar-
ticle 1C(5)-(6) give rise to several concerns. These concerns revolve
mainly around a lack of attention to and resources for proper operation,
stemming largely from the to-date infrequent application of the clauses.46
Regarding Article 1C(l)-(4), Fitzpatrick and Bonoan argue that deci-
sion-makers should focus on several areas: the voluntariness of the
change in personal circumstances; the intent of an individual in seeking
the change; and the existence of effective, lasting protection as a result of
47such a change. The arguments of the authors imply that increased usage
and visibility of the clauses will lead to better practices in their opera-
tion.
By highlighting the current problems and possible responses, Fitz-
patrick and Bonoan give both a clear understanding of cessation under
the 1951 Convention and a foundation for consistent and possibly in-
creased application of the clauses in the future. This is done, moreover,
with a view towards a durable solution-repatriation. At the same time,
by arguing for proper steps in applying the cessation clauses, Fitzpatrick
and Bonoan insure that those individuals who have benefited from inter-
national protection will not have that protection removed in error.
Vulnerability does not end with a granting of asylum and individuals
who may potentially be returned to a frontier where they face persecu-
tion at as vulnerable as when they first arrived in a country of asylum.
The modern challenge for Fitzpatrick and Bonoan is resolving the
proper and successful operation of the cessation clauses. To resolve they
flesh out the framework with procedural measures currently lacking that
yet mean a great deal to the application of the law of cessation. Modem
45. Joan Fitzpatrick & Rafael Bonoan, Cessation of Refugee Protection, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 491.
46. See generally id. at 499-522.
47. Id. at 523.
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interest in the cessation clauses is increasing and Fitzpatrick and
Bonoan's chapter anticipates this in its solutions.
H. Refugee Family Unity and Reunification
While cessation pertains to the end of a state's role in protection for
an individual and is clearly understood, complex questions of refugee
law and international law arise when a state's protection role extends
beyond an individual to include her family. Refugee situations often dis-
locate families and family members on both sides of borders are
vulnerable to human rights violations. Durable solutions to refugee cri-
ses begin with family unity,4 and Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland's
argument for family reunification in a refugee context accounts for the
vulnerabilities of refugee families 9
Importantly, reuniting families makes protection more effective and
strengthens asylum. 0 The willingness of a state to grant entry to a refu-
gee's family, specifically, shows the commitment of a state to the value
of protecting an individual-an individual's rights as opposed to the in-
terests of the state in migration control." There is no clear legal impetus
for states to unify refugees and their families, however. 2 The 1951 Con-
vention does not mention family unity nor reunification and there are no
current uniform instrumental approaches to family unity and reunifica-
tion. Any existing foundation lies in other human rights conventions or
in Executive Committee conclusions. 3 Thus there is no existing frame-
work to support and no previous legal approaches based on the 1951
Convention itself.
Jastram and Newland, however, argue that family unity and reunifi-
cation are consistent with the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention. 4 Yet they present a quandary: how far should states recog-
nize the value of the family in refugee protection? Does such a value
outweigh state interests in migration control? The implicit answer in this
48. Id. at 555.
49. Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family Unity and Refugee Protection, in REFU-
GEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 562-565.
50. Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 45, at 562-65.
51. Id. at 558, 593-97.
52. The explicit basis of the right to family life for refugees is not found in the 1951
Convention itself but in the non-binding Recommendation B of the Final Act of the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons.
53. The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are the key documents that provide
for family reunification in international law, but make no specific mention of refugee situa-
tions. Jastram & Newland, supra note 49, at 576-77. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 85
is the most pertinent ExCom Conclusion on family unity cited by Jastram and Newland be-
yond the early Recommendation B. Id. at 571 n.47.
54. Id. at 570.
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chapter is affirmative. Yet where does legal justification exist to maxi-
mize the value of such a recognition? It remains to be seen whether the
1951 Convention as drafted provides adequately provides for family
unity and reunification. Is the 1951 Convention, even in combination
with other instruments, the best tool available to maximize the value of
families in refugee protection?.
I. Supervision of the 1951 Convention
The future of UNHCR supervision of 1951 Convention implementa-
tion as provided for by Article 35 of the Convention is the final chapter
in Refugee Protection in International Law. Walter Kilin argues that
UNHCR's hybrid role of state party supervision and field protection in
partnership with states parties is no longer tenable. 6 Kilin proposes a
monitoring Sub-Committee that would report to the Executive Commit-
tee on Convention implementation worldwide.57
Kalin helps the reader reach a clearer understanding of UNHCR's
role under Article 35 and also why many current problems raised in the
other legal opinions remain potentially unresolved. For Klin's proposal
to be implemented and then successfully to resolve problems in the
status quo would require a significant directional shift in refugee protec-
tion. His chapter is notable as well, however, for the contradictions
suggested in the current system of UNHCR supervision.
For Kalin, the current system of Convention supervision prevents the
goals of the Global Consultations from being realized, at least in part. A
monitoring and supervising body could facilitate a clearer understanding
of international refugee law and the protection dilemmas that arise in
implementation. Such a body could allow for shared information and
best practices and eventual consistent implementation of the law. A lack
of uniformity and supervision undermines to a large extent durable solu-
tions to refugee problems and respect for vulnerable displaced people. 8
The refugee community expects states to embrace modem challenges, to
shore up protection principles and to explore new approaches without
any uniform, independent guidance. Perhaps most importantly, there is at
55. "A perspective broader than that of the 1951 Convention is essential to understanding
the scope and content of the right to family unity for refugees." Id. at 569.
56. KAlin, supra note 18, at 628-34. Put simply, UNHCR cannot publicly push states
parties on issues of deficient 1951 Convention implementation as a monitor and at the same
time maintain close working relationships to provide protection in the field as a partner of
states parties.
57. See generally id. at 657-59.
58. Id. at 633-634.
[Vol. 25:751
Refugee Protection in International Law
present no external uniform international pressure brought to bear in de-
cisions of states parties on these issues."
By highlighting these roadblocks to achievement of the Global Con-
sultations goals, Walter Klin furthers those same goals. The pace at
which such a change should take place, however, is a variable in his
chapter,60 and a variable in all the chapters, albeit largely unspoken. How
urgent are the collective authors' calls for change? Does the political will
for implementation exist?
III. CONCLUSION: GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, REFUGEE PROTECTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
The goals of the second track of the Global Consultations as stated
by Erika Feller, Director of International Protection, were:
• To reach a clearer understanding and a more consistent im-
plementation of international refugee law;
• To realize durable protection solutions for refugees;
• To maintain respect for the world's most vulnerable people,
those most likely displaced in any refugee situation;
• To strengthen the asylum system and make protection more
effective;
• To rise to the challenges facing modem international refugee
law;
• To shore up the framework of international protection prin-
ciples;
* To explore the scope of enhancing protection through new
approaches;
• To share best practices between states;
• To work toward sharing burdens more equitably;
• To work toward the implementation of framework principles
clarified to a modem meaning;
* To achieve all of this within the same original document: the
1951 Convention.
59. Id.
60. ld. at 660-61.
Spring 20041
Michigan Journal of International Law
Since the drafting of the 1951 Convention, uncertainty of law has
arisen in many areas. At the turn of the century this uncertainty is mainly
in the following areas:
" The continued validity of the principle of refoulement under
the 1951 Convention and in customary international law;
" Detention and penalties for asylum seekers;
" The meaning of "membership in a particular social group";
" Gender-related persecution;
* The internal alternative to international refugee protection;
" Exclusion from refugee status;
* Cessation of refugee status;
* Family unity and reunification in refugee protection;
" Supervision of the 1951 Convention.
The continued validity of the 1951 Convention framework of refugee
protection logically depends on the realization of the goals of the Global
Consultations. The future of refugee protection depends on solutions to
the areas of uncertainty outlined above. Thus, it can be argued that the
future of refugee protection under the 1951 Convention depends at least
somewhat upon realizing the Global Consultation goals through resolu-
tion of the problems addressed by the authors in Refugee Protection in
International Law. Do efforts to address the specific protection issues
address the more general concerns embodied in the goals?
Individually, the legal opinions address the uncertainties in refugee
protection and this review shows the threads of the Global Consultations
goals running through each opinion. This may seem an anachronistic
analysis for nowhere in the legal opinions are the goals of the Global
Consultations mentioned or referenced. It is no coincidence, however,
that the goals correspond with the analysis of each author, for the goals
of the Global Consultations are not new concepts but answers to prob-
lems shared by many in the refugee protection community.
Yet the Global Consultations process itself is a new concept with a
specific mandate from states parties. The discussion of areas of uncer-
tainty within the framework of the Global Consultations must
acknowledge this framework and seize the opportunity to link specific
refugee protection issues with broader goals of the system of refugee
protection. Thus, I respectfully present two simple criticisms of the book
as a whole: first, more effort could have been taken to identify the goals
of the Global Consultations both as goals of a process and for the future
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of refugee protection; and second, more effort should have been taken to
identify the achievement of the goals of the Global Consultations within
the analysis of each area of uncertainty. Refugee Protection in Interna-
tional Law is a persuasive, impressive and authoritative book. It could be
all the more so if it had been explicitly situated, in its parts and as a
whole, as seizing and succeeding in a great opportunity to lay the foun-
dation for the future of refugee protection.
Refugee Protection in International Law is a unique work and a sig-
nificant achievement both in academic scholarship and in refugee
protection. The depth of knowledge brought together is both daunting
and inspiring, for here are starting points for legal solutions to many of
the uncertainties that have perplexed practitioners, decision-makers, pol-
icy-makers and academics alike for some time. Both emotions on the
part of the reader speak to the authority of the book and the effort of its
contributors and editors. Refugee Protection in International Law ad-
dresses the uncertainties for future refugee protection with a view to the
goals of the Global Consultations, in turn furthering those goals them-
selves. It lays a foundation for academic work that will flesh out ideas
necessary to the continued realization of these goals. Finally, the book
argues strongly that the 1951 Convention is the proper document for fu-
ture refugee protection.
Refugee Protection in International Law is a fitting tribute to the
continuing value of the 1951 Convention on its fiftieth anniversary.
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